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Abstract 
Preventive, proactive airside, pre-take-off safety in civil air 
traffic from a new viewpoint with a new toolset on a more exact 
way with sustaining all necessary principles - to explicate such 
and similar thoughts is the aim of the paper.
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1 Introduction, system identification
The	level	of	safety	is	a	specially	interesting	question	in	the	








aries	 in	 the	European	 airspace	 but	 radically	 boosts	 traffic	 on	















erned by the ESARR 3	(use	of	Safety	Management	Systems	by	
ATM	Service	Providers)	and	ESARR4.	 (Risk	Assessment	and	
Mitigation	in	ATM).	ICAO	Annex	19	describes	the	necessary	
safety	management	 provisions	 and	minimum	 safety	manage-
ment practices. Aerodrome operations, for example, runway 
maintenance,	 refuelling,	apron	management,	are	governed	by	
the	ICAO	Annex	14	safety	management	provisions.	Certifica-
tion	 of	 aerodromes	 is	 based	 upon	 the	Aerodrome	Operator’s	
Safety	 Management	 System.	Aircraft	 Operators	 have	 provi-
sions	 for	 aerodrome	 assessment,	 before	 commencing	 flight	
operations,	 in	 their	 regulations	 (JAR OPS 1 and 3).	Require-
















with its own parameters.
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Fig. 1	The	integrated	air	traffic	system	schematic	block	diagram	model
Based	 on	 theory	 of	 Zadeh,	 Polak	 (1972)	 abstract	 objects,	
function	space	theory,	design	attributes	mapping	of	Takeda	et.	
al.	 (1990),	 Piros	 (2012),	Čavka,	Čokorilo,	Vasov,	 (2015)	 the	
integrated	aviation,	air	traffic	system	model	is	shown	above	on	
Fig.	 1.	 It	 includes	 concerning	 static	 and	dynamic	parameters	
of	 air	 traffic	 control	 (ATC),	 aircraft	 (AC)	 and	 airport	 (AD),	
like	 sections	of	 the	current	air	 traffic	contextual.	The novelty 
of the system approach is based on three attributes: integra-

























  RWY, runway elements, movements, processes.
From	α1_1 to	α5_n	the elements, persons, processes were inves-
tigated.	








Po:  operation 
parameters
Ph:  human 
parameters
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3 Fault tree analysis









that	 according	 to	 the	 runway	environment	and	 the	calculated	
level of safety parameters described in the fault tree-structured 
classification	categories	corresponding	to	the	high-safety	sys-
tems	fitted	to	the	highest	safety	integrity	classifications.	
Based on the analysis of the importance of elementary 
events	and	their	parameters	to	the	factors	influencing	the	run-
way accident occurrence probability of the incorrect action 
absolute	 human	 significance.	 It	 can	 also	 be	 seen	 from	 the	
importance	of	elementary	events	by	analyzing	and	evaluating	
the	minimum	cutsets,	 that	human	actions	are	outstanding	by	




errors where human actions can be traced. Based on the results, 
the	indirect	or	latent	failures	have	particularly	special	significance.
The	effect	of	the	influence	of	human	error	of	air	traffic	con-
trol	weaker	as	 the	failure	of	 tools	 like	A-SMGCS	(Advanced	
Surface	Movement	Guidance	System)	to	assist	the	decision.	
The	significance	such	airport	infrastructure	failures	like	PAPI	




infrastructure and its status.
Factors	 affecting	 runway	 accident	 occurrence	 probability	
the	aircraft	failure	has	minor	effect	as	pilots	failure	or	air	traffic	
controllers,	or	the	ATCOs	decision	supporting	systems.
After the FTA, scenario analysis was made with the fault 
tree.	The	 study	 confirmed	 that	 the	 characteristics	 changes	 of	
meteorological	 parameters,	 human	 parameters,	 operation	
parameters	and	technology	parameters,	in	those	the	units	con-
cerned	are	interdependent	relations,	as	shown	on	Fig.	4.	This	
is the base of the establishment of the fuzzy inference system 
framework	to	define	the	level	of	safety.
4 Predictive ALARP with fuzzy logic
Derived from the fault tree analysis in Matlab was built a 
group	model	framework.	The	first	element	of	the	research,	the	
first	predictive	fuzzy	inference	system	is	presented	in	this	paper.	
The structure of Fuzzy Predictive ALARP Inference System is 
shown	on	Fig.	5.
Fig. 4 Dynamic	flight	complexity	parameters
Fig. 5 Fuzzy Predictive ALARP Inference System
Soft	computing	method	(fuzzy	logic)	was	necessary	because	
of the choice of system features, a lot of points because of the 
lack	 of	 an	 exact	 description	 of	 the	 system	 is	 currently	 using	
smart formalization. 
Structure,	 editing	 and	 monitoring	 of	 FPALARP	 inference	
system	 was	 built	 in	 MATLAB	 Version	 7.2.0.232	 (R2006a)	
using	Fuzzy	Logic	Toolbox.






•	 such features of the system could also be considered, 
where	the	existing	research	does	not	provide	a	solution
•	 capable	of	flight	safety,	actual	 	 factors	with	proven	rel-
evance	to	take	into	account
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•	 the comparison of the relevant procedures for effective 
analysis	and	highly	secure	air	transport	system	has	deter-
mined that the impact of actual dominant factor in many 
aviation	safety	relevances	in	influencing	the	level	of	pro-
cedures does not appear.






to civil aviation runways and their environment that handles 




system which model handles this system in an abstract system 
of	 objects	 -	 in	 a	 novel	way	 as	 compared	 to	 previous	 results	
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